“So we’ve got beliefs P and Q. Let’s say Q is “obviously unreasonable” by virtue of beliefs R(1), R(2), R(3), and so forth, when taken as a set. Let’s leave aside considerations of individual or joint sufficiency. Call this set {R}. So {R} implies that Q is false ({R} –> ~Q). To say that belief P does not make belief Q obviously unreasonable is merely to say that P is not a member of {R}. And I think this is what we’re arguing over. Figuring out whether P is or is not contained in {R} may or may not be worth doing, depending on the contents of the argument.”
~ our own William Brafford in the comments to his latest post, doing his best to sully the reputation of internet comboxes everywhere.
Borat: “I do a picture, only small, of the Tishnik Masacre. Where many Uzbeks…crushed!”
Kindly Gray Hippie: “How did you feel when you drew this?”
Borat: “Very proud!”.
KGH: “I’m just listening with sadness…a little sadness for your people…?”
Borat: “Yes…no, it is not sad. It is us who do the kill!”
When in doubt,
{ 5 comments }
Wha-? Whoa!? Hey!
(Does the reputation of internet comboxes really need my help?)
Hey I didn’t say it was a bad thing…. ;-)
Oh. There it is. I see what you did.
I’d just like to say that I adore that paragraph.
I asked William to take up some math blogging. He won’t bite, but this is as close as we’ll get I bet. Magisterial.
Comments on this entry are closed.