The Capture of Baradar

The capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s Number 2 man, is, undoubtedly, good news for the Obama administration in its attempts to fend off claims of being soft on terror and the like. But, as per his usual adroitness, Juan Cole has a good post up pointing out why the capture might not be the good news for US efforts in Afghanistan that proponents might like to make it out as. What I took to be the most important snippet,

There are four groups typically but inaccurately referred to as Taliban among Pashtun dissidents. They include Mulla Umar’s original Taliban; the Haqqani Network founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, based in North Waziristan, which is now led by his son Siraj; the Islamic Party or Hizb-i Islami of Gulbaddin Hikmatyar based in Eastern Afghanistan; and the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan or Taliban Movement of Pakistan, whose leader, Hakimullah Mahsud, was reported recently killed by a US drone strike). For Mullah Omar’s organization, based in Karachi and Quetta, to suffer a severe setback would probably not have a huge impact on the other three, which operate relatively independently. None of the others is actually Taliban in the sense of seminary students or graduates of madrasahs among the Afghan Pashtun refugees in Pakistan.

This news is certainly bad news for, as Cole calls them, the “Old Taliban”, but the situation in Afghanistan remains greatly more complicated and challenging than much of American foreign policy discourse at home let’s on. By and large, it seems that US foreign policy remains under Obama, as it certainly has under all preceeding presidents, to be the continutation of Cold War mentality by other means. Which is to say that the realities of fourth generation warfare continue to seem largely opaque to the US strategic focus and there persists this idea that if specific bad guys, be they Al Qaeda or the Taliban, are beaten then the rest of the chips will inevitably fall into place, or something to that effect. But as the National Security Archive notes, even “the bad guys” have caught on to the folly of this thinking,

The December 1998 Embassy cable mentioned above notes that Omar “maintains an idiosyncratic, almost obscurantist, leadership style,” making policy decisions, “but generally leav[ing] the day-to-day matters to his key lieutenants.” In order to ensure his deputies remain “off balance” and do “not grow overly comfortable in their positions, Omar also rotates Taliban officials from post-to-post, apparently at a whim.”

I mean, call me crazy, but I find it hard to believe that Mullah Omar and other top “Old Taliban” officials haven’t contemplated the possibility of a capture of this magnitude and factored a needed exit plan itno their already much more decentralized organizational structure. Part of the shift in fourth generational warfare, as I understand it, is to recognize that the battle ceases only to operate in an exclusive military theatre and stretches out across a far broader spectrum of foray. It is this realization that I continue failing to hear in most overtly militaristic US foreign policy articulations and a big part of what informs my skepticism about the eventual outcomes.

Which is not to say that military means don’t play any role in dealing with groups like the “Old Taliban” and the others with which US and other NATO forces are dealing in Afghanistan and elsewhere and it certainly isn’t to suggest that I have a nice, clean alternative to the overwhelming challenges in dealing with the myriads of groups intent on doing harm to what amounts to a way of life. Nor is it to say that I’m inclined to dismiss the importance of the potential shift in Pakistani willingness to work in a more coordinated and proactive fashion with American and NATO forces. But is to say that I’ll continue not jumping for joy over new like the capture of Baradar so long as it is apparent, as far as western foreign policy goes, war remains the primary continuation of politics by other means.

Tagged as: Afghanistan, Fourth Generation Warfare, Mullah Baradar, Old Taliban, Pakistan